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Intuition and Insight: two concepts that illuminate the tacit in science 
education 
 
We can know more than we can tell. 
(Polanyi, 1966/2009, p4) 
1.0 Introduction: Studying the tacit 
 
Tacit knowledge may seem a paradoxical and unrewarding area for study. Tacit 
knowledge is defined as knowledge that ‘cannot be explicitly stated’ (Polanyi, 1966, p4, 
italics removed), so it must seem that any investigation of implicit knowledge, must 
remain, to some extent, speculative. We tend to overvalue the effectiveness of 
introspection (Pronin, 2009, p3) and assume we are fully aware of our own thinking 
(Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992, p797). However, much of higher-order processing 
may not be available to conscious awareness (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p232). 
Researchers have sought to understand nonconscious perception by its influence on 
conscious thought (Dresp-Langely, 2012, p3) but, by definition, can only be aware of the 
effects of the nonconscious processes not the tacit processes themselves (Miller, 1962, 
p50). This indirect awareness distorts the perception of tacit processes, for example, in 
the case of insight, giving the appearance of rapid, almost spontaneous arrival of ideas 
into conscious awareness (Smith, 1995, p242). The inaccessibility of tacit knowledge 
might encourage researchers to avoid the concept entirely. 
 
However, a number of researchers have developed experimental approaches that 
have allowed them to make assumptions about tacit knowledge (Wagner & Sternberg, 
1985; Reber, 1989; Kanheman, 2011). Though tacit knowledge cannot be studied 
directly, its influence on conscious thought may be inferred. To draw an analogy, 
physicists cannot observe black holes directly, but study their properties through their 
interactions with surrounding matter (Chow, 2008, p101). Two processes by which tacit 
knowledge interacts with conscious thinking are intuition and insight. Though insight 
and intuition have a history of being used synonymously (Simon, 1986, p242; Fischbein, 
1987, p5; Schooler & Dougal, 1999, p281), I will argue that they are two distinct 
phenomena. The terms intuition and insight will be defined in more detail below but a 
brief definition will be given here to aid the reader. Intuitions may be thought of as tacit 
hunches or feelings that come to mind with little conscious awareness of processing. An 
insight is an explicit awareness of novel relations that arrives with apparent suddenness 
but with little conscious awareness of processing. It is important to draw an ontological 
distinction between hypothetical cognitive entities (hunches, feelings, awarenesses) and 
processes that make use of those entities (See table 1). This paper will make use of both 
senses of the terms.  
 
 As a supposed cognitive entity 
(E.g. an intuition, an insight) 
As a process (E.g. intuitive thinking/ to 
have an insight) 
Intuition An intuition is a tacit hunch or 
feeling that influences thought 
with little conscious effort.  
The influence of tacit hunches or 
feelings on conscious thought. 
Insight An insight is an explicit 
awareness of novel relations 
between concepts that arrives 
with apparent suddenness and 
little conscious awareness of 
processing. 
The development of an explicit 
awareness of novel relations between 
concepts with apparent suddenness 
and little conscious awareness of 
processing. 
Table 1: Defining intuition and insight as entities and processes 
 
These definitions highlight distinctions between insight and intuition. Insights, 
as experienced, typically have a short duration, though an extended period of conscious 
and tacit incubation may have preceded the insight. Secondly, given its description as an 
awareness of novel relations, insight usually occurs only once for a given set of relations 
(it is possible that forgetting an insight may allow a similar event to reoccur, though this 
is not seen as the norm). Typically the novel awareness developed in insight becomes 
part of explicit understanding. By contrast, intuitions may influence conscious thought 
repeatedly over an extended period. It is also worth noting the different availability to 
consciousness of the two processes: an insight is a conscious awareness (though the 
processes that lead to this result are, at least partly, tacit) whereas intuitions themselves 
may be imagined as tacit knowledge.  
 
Both intuition and insight can be conceptualised as processes in which the tacit 
interacts with conscious thought (see figure 1). The tacit-explicit connection, which 
exists in both concepts, makes them a fruitful place to begin the study of the non-
conscious. Using the concepts of intuition and insight as links to the non-conscious, this 





Figure 1: Intuition and insight as links to the tacit 
 
I will begin section two by defining and differentiating the terms intuition and 
insight and explaining their relation to tacit knowledge. The paper is then divided into 
two sections, separately examining the concepts of intuition and insight. In discussing 
each concept I shall address the following themes: 1) the concept in the work of 
scientists; 2) the relationship of the concept to constructs in science education research; 
3) the conditions that promote or hinder the use of the concept; 4) the productiveness of 
the concept; and 5) proposed strategies to support the productive form of the concept in 
the classroom. The differing nature of the two concepts requires that, in section two, the 
constructs in science education, the sections on intuition and insight will have differing 
foci. For intuition, I will examine two conceptualisations of intuition: embodied 
cognition and abstracted rules. This will lead to a discussion of the entanglement of tacit 
and explicit concepts. In the insight section, I will discuss the relationship between 
insight and rapid conceptual change and the formation of novel conceptual connections. 
The review concludes with the proposal of five research questions to guide a future 
research programme into tacit knowledge in science education. 
 









2.0 Defining terms 
2.1 Definitions of intuition 
 
In the recent years, a growing interest in the previously neglected phenomenon 
of intuition (Claxton, 1988, p217) has seen the publication of several popular books on 
the subject (Chabris & Simons, 2010; Gladwell, 2005; Myers, 2004). Indeed, empirical 
research-programs investigating intuition exist in the fields of nursing, emergency 
medicine, business and law among others (Sinclair, 2011). Hodgkinson and Saddler-
Smith (2011, p52) argue that intuition is ‘a legitimate subject of social scientific inquiry 
with important implications for educational... decision-making’ and present multiple 
empirical methods that have been used to investigate the construct in the laboratory 
(for detail on the methods used to study intuition see: Sinclair, 2014 and Glöckner & 
Witteman, 2010).   
 
The term intuition derives from the Latin intueri meaning 'to look upon' or 'to 
see within' (Goldberg, 1985, p31). Intuition has been described as a ‘semantic riddle’ 
(Bastick, 1982, p1) and ‘the last frontier of the mind’ (Cloninger, 2006, p15) as it was 
thought to be resistant to empirical measurement (Sinclair & Ashkansay, 2005, p355). 
Petitmengin-Peugeot (1999, p44) argues the commonly reported difficulty in defining 
intuition arises from its nonconscious nature. Definitions of intuition (for a 
comprehensive list see: Dane & Pratt, 2007, p35) tend to share two characteristics: a) 
intuition is rapid and b) it occurs without conscious awareness. Of the seventeen 
definitions of intuition listed by Dane and Pratt (2007, p35) eleven include some sense 
of nonconscious processing and five refer to its speed. For example Kahneman (2003, 
p697) defines intuition as ‘thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and 
without much reflection’ and Lieberman (2000, p111) opts for ‘[t]he subjective 
experience of a mostly nonconscious process- fast, a-logical, and inaccessible to 
consciousness.’ In choosing the major components of intuition, Dane and Pratt (2007, 
p36) propose, in addition to speed and nonconsciousness, a holistic and an affective 
nature, which I will argue, are unnecessary elements for a definition of intuition in 
science education. The description of holistic understanding as the ‘recognition of 
patterns and structures’ (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p37), is closer to the definition of insight 
given above, than to intuition. Physical intuitions may exist as tacit hunches or feelings 
concerning physical systems; for example, a moving object requires a force to remain in 
motion (Driver et al., 1994, p158). A holistic component of intuition is not always 
present. Dane and Pratt’s (2007, p36) final component of intuition, affect, is difficult to 
define but may be thought of as ‘consciously accessible feelings’ (Fredrickson, 2001, p2), 
including emotions but also physical sensations and moods. By definition, intuitions are 
nonconscious and though emotions may, sometimes, be associated with fruitful 
applications of intuitions, there is no evidence to suggest that such feelings occur in all 
cases. Though I will argue that kinesthetic representations may be a component of some 
intuitions (see section 3.2.1), there is insufficient evidence to claim intuitions are 
invariably grounded in physical sensations. Therefore, I shall restrict my analysis to the 
two necessary components of intuition: its speed and nonconscious nature.  
2.1.1 Speed of intuition 
 
Many definitions of intuition contain some implication of rapidity (E.g. ‘fast’ 
(Lieberman, 2000, p111); ‘immediate knowledge’ (Myres, 2002, p129); 
‘operates…quickly’ (Kahneman, 2011, p105)). In discussing the nature of intuitive 
physics, diSessa (2002, p39) describes the activation of phenomenological knowledge as 
having a rapidity of recognition that cannot be put into words: ‘One simply sees them in 
some situations and not in others.’ It may be that non-formal (or intuitive) concepts ‘can 
be interpreted in ways which are fast and effortless’ as they require ‘little or no 
deliberate processing, nor any explicit invocation of a definition of the concept‘ (Reif, 
1987, p403). Whilst intuition is commonly described as rapid, slower tacit realisation 
are also reported:  
 
However, neither speed nor certainty are necessarily correlates of 
intuitive thought. While it is true that we often make speedy 
judgments about many issues, some people report experiencing 
intuition as a slow realization of a state, an impression being built up 
over time by a succession of minor intuitions. (Hogarth, 2001, p10) 
 
The experienced speed of intuition may be due to a lack of awareness of underlying 
processing (Bolte & Goschke, 2005, p1249) and ‘reﬂect the sudden conscious 
availability’ of a tacit concept (Kounios, et al., 2006, p883) rather than the existence of 
some special, rapid, form of cognition. It is problematic that a defining feature of 
intuition, it’s apparent rapid availability, may simply be a correlate of its nonconscious 
nature and not a reflection of speed of processing. However, the subjective experience of 
rapidity of occurrence to consciousness is a useful marker for describing the intuitive 
process.   
2.1.2 Nonconscious nature of intuition 
 
At least some of what goes on in the brain is not conscious and not available to 
conscious thought (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Intuitions are seen as arising from such 
tacit knowledge (Wyatt, 2001; Smith, 2001) that may develop through the operation of 
implicit learning, a nonconscious process that results in abstracted knowledge (Reber, 
1989, p219). Evidence from a number of studies indicates participants may learn to 
perform well on a task but be unable to describe explicitly the skills they have used 
(Reber, 1989; Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Miller, 1967). One construct that accounts for 
tacit knowledge is diSessa’s phenomenological primitives or p-prims: ‘”pieces” of 
intuitive knowledge’ (diSessa, 2000, p91). DiSessa describes p-prims as ‘inarticulate,’ 
‘not strongly related to dictionary lexicon’ and without ‘explicit propositional form’ 
(diSessa, 1993, p119). P-prims are thought to be abstracted from ‘body sensations and 
internal sensorimotor terms’ (diSessa, 1993, p119) and therefore beyond language. The 
most developed account of intuition in the science education literature occurs in 
Clement’s (2008) work. As I have argued in table one, Clement (2008, p207) proposed 
intuition can be used to refer to both ‘knowledge structures and nonformal reasoning 
processes.’ He implies that the lack of conscious justification of intuitions may due to 
their axiomatic nature:  
 
An intuition is a knowledge structure (schema) that resides in long-
term memory and that can be activated to provide an interpretation of 
or an expectation about a system…Subjects do not feel a need to further 
justify, derive, or explain intuitions. They are self-evident. This does not 
mean that an explanation or finer analysis is impossible, but that none 
is needed because the behavior is self-evident to the subject. (Clement, 
2008, p208) 
 
Kahneman (2011, pp. 98-99) describes such nonformal reasoning processes as 
heuristics. Heuristics are categorised as belonging to a scheme of thought called system 
1, involving automatic, rapid and tacit cognition. System 1 processes may be overridden 
by the slower, more deliberate and explicit system 2. The interaction between these two 
kinds of processing determines how we come to understand the world: a model known 
as the ‘two systems model’ (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 98-99). One example of a system 1 
process is the availability heuristic: the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of 
events with greater “availability” in memory, for example the propensity to 
overestimate the likelihood of emotionally charged events such as plane crashes 
(Kahneman, 2011, p98, pp. 129-145). Heuristics can be powerful shortcuts in some 
situations but lead to incorrect assumptions in other contexts (see section 3.4). The 
experience of intuition, an explicit feeling of knowledge that is not full articulable, 
bridges the boundary between the tacit and explicit. 
2.2 Definitions of insight 
 
Everyone who has ever communicated something complicated to 
another person has seen it. It is a troubled expression framed with 
quizzical eyebrows. As the teacher, the face you are looking into is 
clearly providing nonverbal cues that your eloquent explanation is 
not having its intended results and the learner is not learning. Then, 
sometimes almost magically, sometimes after considerable effort, 
sometimes after intervention from others, the facial muscles on the 
learner relax, and you can literally “see” the learner crossing to the 
other side. Something new is now understood. Mission accomplished. 
You really are a teacher—at least for this moment. (Halpern, 2005, 
p141) 
 
Although it is related to, and often confused with intuition, insight is the more 
clearly defined process (Hogarth, 2001, p12). Insight has been described as ‘the process 
by which a problem solver suddenly moves from a state of not knowing how to solve a 
problem to a state of knowing how to solve it’ (Mayer, 1995, p3), and is linked with 
“Aha!” experiences (Kounios & Beeman, 2009; Dominowski & Dallob, 1995, p38). 
Confining insight to the domain of problem solving would seem to limit its scope; it 
might be assumed that students can experience moments of insight in learning about a 
new conceptual area as well as in problem solving. 
 
A broader definition of insight conceptualises it as the movement from relative 
confusion to comprehension (Dominowski & Dallob, 1995, p37). This is useful as an 
approximation but problematic as comprehension is both difficult to define and assess. 
Probably the most common component of definitions of insight is the process of forming 
novel connections between concepts (see for example: Wren et al., 2004, p390; Bowden 
et al., 2005, p324; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004, p506). Consider one of the most cited 
models of insight: Sternberg and Davidson’s three-process model (1983, p53). This 
construction proposes three possible routes to insight: a) selective encoding: ‘sifting out 
relevant information’; b) selective combination: ‘combining what might originally seem 
to be isolated pieces of information into a unified whole’; and c) selective comparison 
‘relating newly acquired information to information acquired in the past’ (Sternberg & 
Davidson, 1983, pp. 53-54).   
 
The selective encoding process (Sternberg & Davidson, 1983, p53), which is 
likely to involve the kind of extended memory searches reported before insight (Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004, p504), may occur during the incubation period that precedes 
insight (see section 3.3). As the tacit nature of these processes makes them challenging 
to describe (though neural-imaging studies are beginning to provide some information 
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004)), the definition of insight used in this paper will focus on the 
sudden conscious awareness of novel relations between concepts. 
 
As with intuition, the most significant investigation of the concept in science 
education is found in John Clement’s research. He argues sudden advances in learning 
are insight-like if: 
 
1. The breakthrough is an important idea… 
2. The breakthrough adds significantly to the subject’s 
knowledge. It produces a large structural change in the 
subject’s model… 
3. The subject’s ideas are generated fairly quickly during the 
breakthrough, and he achieves rapid subsequent progress 
towards a solution. 
4. The breakthrough is accompanied by more complex 
phenomena: 
(a) It is accompanied by indicators of emotional response - 
surprise, joy, satisfaction. 
(b) The subject realizes immediately that something 
important has been discovered. (Clement, 2008, p103) 
 
In addition to insight events, Clement proposes ‘pure Eureka events,’ insights in 
which the emergence of the new idea is ‘extremely fast,’ an existing idea is replaced in 
its entirety by a new model and the ‘the process is not explainable via normal reasoning 
processes; extraordinary thought processes that are unconscious or different from 
normal thought processes are involved’ (Clement, 2008, pp. 103-104). It seems unlikely 
that these two processes are clearly distinguishable, and no evidence is presented for 
‘extraordinary thought processes’ yet the definition captures something of the essence 
of a moment of insight. It would seem that points (1) and (4) of Clement’s definition of 
insight above may be occasional, but by no means necessary, correlates of insight. 
Researchers report the unreliability of emotional markers of understanding (Ylikoski, 
2009, p104) and I do not feel sufficient evidence exists to link all moments of insight 
with such feelings. In addition, it is difficult to understand what ‘important’ might mean 
in this context.  
In section 4.2.2, I will propose examples of insight as existing at a range of 
complexities: some insights involve the formation of relatively simple connections 
whereas others involve the widespread rearrangements of conceptual structure. The 
meaning of a concept is defined by its relationship to other concepts (Taber, 2013, 
p232), and hence changes in conceptual connections can be seen as conceptual change 
(Tyson et al., 1997, p391). If conceptual change is seen as a type of learning (Vosniadou, 
2013, p1) then insights can be seen to result in a range of different types of learning. 
Some insights might be seen as resulting in understanding, meaning ‘seeing the overall 
picture and how the parts relate to the whole’ (Entwistle & Nisbet, 2013, p9), whereas 
other insights may lead to an awareness of simpler connections. To encompass this 
range of possibilities insight is defined simply as an awareness of novel relations. The 
definition of insight used here will relate to sudden changes in conceptual relationships, 
without reference to emotion or scale of the change: An insight is an explicit awareness 
of novel relations between concepts that arrives with apparent suddenness and little 
conscious awareness of processing. 
2.3 Differentiating intuition and insight 
 
 Though insight and intuition have a history of being used synonymously (Simon, 
1986, p242; Fischbein, 1987, p5; Schooler & Dougal, 1999, p281), contemporary writers 
are increasingly attempting to separate the two processes. For example, Liebermann 
argues:  
 
[I]ntuition must be distinguished from insight… insight is a process 
where one suddenly becomes aware of the logical relations 
between a problem and the answer. In the case of intuition, usually 
there is no insight into the logical relations, but simply an impetus, 
judgment, hunch, or behavioral response. That said, intuition is the 
subjective experience of a mostly nonconscious process that is fast, 
a-logical, and inaccessible to consciousness. (Liebermann, 2000, 
pp. 110-111) 
 
Dane and Pratt (2007, p40) also distinguish the two processes, describing 
insight as when one ‘…consciously becomes aware of the logical connections supporting 
a particular answer or solution’ which may be a lengthy process preceded by explicit, 
analytical thought whereas in intuition ‘…one is unable to consciously account for the 
rationale underlying the judgment that has arisen.’ These differences might be 
summarised as follows: 
 
An intuition is a tacit hunch or feeling that influences thought with 
little conscious effort.  
 
An insight is an explicit awareness of novel relations between 
concepts that arrives with apparent suddenness and little 
conscious awareness of processing.  
 
The term novel in the definition of insight refers to personal originality; 
returning to a previously experienced awareness is not an instance of insight. To 
illustrate the difference between intuition and insight consider the following problem 
(Jargocki, 1983, p30): A metal disc with a central hole (like a washer) is heated to a 
uniform temperature. Does the area of the hole increase, decrease or remain the same? 
On hearing the problem one may develop a feeling or hunch as to how the area of the 
hole will change. This may be based on knowledge that is difficult to articulate and be 
thought of as an intuition. On the other hand, if a solution comes to mind suddenly, 
perhaps after a period of incubation, and with little awareness of process, it may be 
described as an insight. A third possibility is the problem is solved through deliberate, 
conscious thought. Though they do so in different ways, both intuition and insight are 
processes by which the tacit influences the explicit, and therefore offer an opportunity 
for opening a discussion of tacit knowledge. The next two sections, will consider 
intuition and insight in more detail.  
3.0 The concept of intuition 
 
In order to develop an understanding of the concept of intuition in science 
education, I will begin by examining its role in the work of scientists. The position of 
intuition in science education will be examined by conceptualising intuition first as 
embodied cognition and secondly as abstracted rules. The relationship between tacit 
and explicit concepts in science education will be considered before examining the 
factors that promote and hinder intuition. After considering how intuition may be 
considered supportive and obstructive to the goals of school science, I conclude the 
section by proposing ideas to support productive intuition in the classroom.  
3.1 Intuition in the work of scientists 
 
This section, which examines reports of intuition from scientists, and section 4.1 
which sets out a similar accounts of insight, must be read with the caveat that 
descriptions of changes in public models of science cannot be assumed to correlate with 
the manner in which psychological models change. Though Kuhnian revolutionary 
change has been linked to radical conceptual change in science education (e.g., Strike & 
Posner, 1992; Nersessian, 1999), Kuhn himself, in his later work, advised against this 
conflation, instead proposing that ‘revolutions should be described not in terms of group 
experience but in the varied experiences of individual group members’ (Kuhn, 1993, pp. 
xii-xiii). It is this position that will be used for these sections: the descriptions of 
intuition and insight of scientists are descriptions of personal experiences: there is no 
intention to draw parallels between changes in public and psychological knowledge. As 
will be argued in section 3.5.2, these examples may prove to be useful exemplars for 
teachers to present to students who are learning how to integrate their own intuitions 
with the scientific ideas they are taught in school. 
 
Several researchers report scientists’ claims to have used intuition in their work 
(Goldberg, 1985, p28; Marton, Fensham & Chaiklin, 1994; Wolpert, 1992, p56) though 
their reports may be referring to a range of phenomena, different from the definition of 
intuition used in this review. Experts in physics are described as having good ‘physical 
intuition’ (Larkin et al., 1980, p1335) and there are similar references to ‘biological 
intuition’ (Slatkin, 1974, p219; Jansen, 2001, p119; Ragan & Chan, 2013) and ‘chemical 
intuition’ (Keserű, Soós & Kappe, 2014; Catlow, 2013). A survey of papers published in 
physics journals between 2001 and 2010 found that the percentage of studies that used 
the words ‘intuition,’ ‘intuitive’ or ‘counter-intuitive’ varied between seven and nine per 
cent (Tallant, 2013, p2966). In an analysis of broadcasts by Nobel laureates between 
1970 and 1986, Marton, Fensham and Chaiklin (1994, p460) calculated seventy-seven 
percent of the laureates either 'declare explicitly their belief in scientific intuition or 
they make comments about it, thereby taking its existence for granted.’ Shavinina 
(2004) analysed how Nobel laureates in science achieved their breakthroughs and 
concluded intuition was a ‘key aspect of scientific thinking leading to innovative 
discoveries’ (Shavinina, 2004, p250).  
 
Scientists themselves refer to the necessity of intuition: Max Planck proposed 
that the pioneer scientists must ‘have a vivid intuitive imagination, for new ideas are not 
generated by deduction, but by an artistically creative imagination’ (Planck, 1950, 
p109). The theoretical physicist Hideki Yukawa argued that abstraction couldn’t occur 
just by itself ‘but has to be accompanied by intuition or imagination’ (Yukawa, 1973, 
p107). Several scientists report significant hunches that they are not subsequently able 
to justify. Rutherford, on being asked to support his claim that heavy water contains 
tritium, is reported to have roared: 'Reasons! Reasons! I feel it in my water!’ (Rutherford 
quoted in Oliphant, 1972, p19). Watson (1980, pp. 99-101) described his intuition that 
DNA must be a two chain molecule since ‘important biological objects come in pairs,’ 
which, despite Crick’s doubts and a lack of experimental evidence, lead him to began 
investigating two chain models of DNA. 
 
Physicists value the power of physical intuition and refer to it as a decision-making 
tool: ‘A physicist's intuition tells him that, if Einstein's principle is valid at all, it ought to 
be valid for the whole of physics, quantum-mechanical as well as classical’  (Dyson, 
1972, p646). Though the scientific method requires that results of intuition be verified, 
the processes that lead to novel ideas are often difficult to understand in retrospect; the 
process of coming to new scientific ideas is tacit (Polanyi, 1967, p536). For example, 
Jonas Salk, argued: ‘we first sense and then we reason why. Intuition is an innate quality 
and it can be developed and cultivated’ (Salk, 1983, p79). Science involves the interplay 
of intuitive and analytic processes and, both these modes of thought should be 
represented in the classroom.  
 
As I will argue is also the case for students, the testimony of scientists shows 
intuition can be an obstructive as well as a productive process. Rohrlich argued 
scientists such as Newton and Schrödinger continued to develop innovative theories 
despite misgivings and had to suppress an intuition or ‘feeling of what’s right’ (Rohrlich, 
1996, p1624). A great challenge for scientists and school students alike is in knowing 
when intuitions may be trusted, and used to facilitate understanding, and when intuition 
must be ignored and overruled by analytical thought. As well as scientists themselves, 
philosophers of science have argued for the role of intuition. Feyerabend (1970, p90) 
promoted a model of science without a single, defined method but as an arational 
process driven by 'esthetic judgments, judgments of taste and our own subjective 
wishes.' Popper (1959, p8) argued discovery ‘contains an “irrational element,” or a 
“creative intuition.”’ Given the prominent role of intuition in scientific discovery, the 
next section examines the position intuition may play in science education.  
3.2 Intuition in science education research 
 
Despite the reported significance of intuition, there is a perception that it is 
unscientific and akin to mysticism (Claxton, 1998, p217) Laughlin (1997, p22) has 
claimed that '[s]omewhere in the process of formulating the positivist project, the 
intuition baby was thrown out with the metaphysical bath water.' This review hopes to 
begin the process of restoring intuition to its important role in science and science 
education. Teaching science is challenging: in addition to the representations of public 
science (for example the statements in a syllabus or a textbook), tacit knowledge may be 
an important part of scientific knowing (Polanyi, 1966/2009, p20). Polanyi (1966, p5) 
used an analogy to describe the difficulty of science teaching: just as one may be able to 
ride a bicycle without having access to the kinaesthetic knowledge that makes balance 
possible, a teacher may have an excellent understanding of explicit scientific 
propositions but lack awareness of their implicit understandings. Polanyi insists that 
some of the expertise of scientists ‘cannot be put into words, nor even conveyed by 
picture’ (Polanyi, 1966, p5). The next sections deal with two models of intuitive 
knowledge in the context of science education: as embodied cognition and as abstracted 
rules. It is not my intention to make claims for the superiority of either model, rather to 
present them as two approaches for understanding an under-researched concept. 
3.2.1 Intuition in science education research: intuition as embodied 
cognition 
 
It is possible to account for the tacit nature of intuitions if they are 
conceptualised as information that is encoded non-verbally. An early precursor of this 
idea is found in Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2005, p166) notion of ‘knowledge in the hands,’ 
the embodied knowing that allows a typist of find the keys without conscious thought. 
The embodied cognition hypothesis (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008, p60, italics in original) 
posits that ‘conceptual processing… is sensory motor processing,’ and that conceptual 
data is inextricably bound up with tacit, kinaesthetic memories. The plausibility of a link 
between intuition and the motor system is supported by evidence that suggests 
activation of the motor system is fast and automatic (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008, p61) 
and indeed two models of tacit processing in science education, diSessa’s (1993) 
phenomenological primitive account and Clement’s (2008) model of intuition, discussed 
below, invoke kinaesthetic resources. A significant problem for the embodied cognition 
hypothesis is how abstract concepts, such as energy, may be constructed from 
sensorimotor resources. Dove (2011, p11) has suggested that language may act as a 
form of ‘dis-embodied cognition’ that ‘extends cognition’ beyond the concrete and 
perceptual to form abstractions. It is through the mechanism of language, and analogy in 
particular, that perceivable attributes of flow or substance are associated with an 
abstract concept such as heat (Driver et al., 1994, p138).  In this section I will examine 
theories for the development of intuitions as embodied cognition and present a number 
of different constructions of phenomenological knowledge in science education. 
 
Research in science education has shown that learners possess concepts about 
the physical world prior to teaching (McCloskey, 1983; Driver et al. 1994). Such 
concepts have been called ‘intuitive theories’ (McCloskey, 1983, p123; Sherin, 2006, 
p535) though a variety of terms such as ‘misconception,’ ‘alternative conception’ and 
‘preconception’ (Kuiper, 1994, p280) have also been used. Such knowledge may be non-
conscious, for example, the mental models that form part of Simon and Simon’s (1978, 
p224) model of physical intuition may be, to some extent, tacit (Fischbein et al., 1990, 
p24). The ‘perceptual/motor schema’ that Clement (2008, p215) suggests are a part of 
intuitive reasoning are also resistant to verbal explication and transfer.  
 
Links have been proposed between intuitive knowledge and physical experience 
with researchers speculating that intuitive knowledge is formed partly through practical 
physical experiences (Driver, Guesne & Tiberghien, 1985, p2). It has been suggested that 
some kinaesthetic intuitions may develop in early childhood: Von Hofstein and 
colleagues (1998) reported that infants aged 23-26 weeks tended to expect the linear 
motion of an object to continue in a straight line at constant speed. Infants can also 
extrapolate both circular motion at constant speed (von Hofstein, 1983) and sinusoidal 
motion (von Hofstein & Rosander, 1996). The degree to which these intuitions are 
innate or acquired through experience is an open question (Preece, 1984). Though 
intuitions regarding the nature of motion may be of predictive value for infants, they can 
interfere with later scientific learning (see, for example, McCloskey, 1983; Driver et al., 
1994). As students progress, their initial intuitions can be conceptualised as being tuned 
towards expertise (diSessa, 1993, p114) giving rise to a ‘U-shaped’ model of the 
usefulness of intuition over time (Baylor, 2001). Baylor (2001) argued that immature 
and mature intuitions are both fruitful tools for understanding reality (the arms of the 
‘U’), yet there is an intermediate phase in which intuitive concepts clash with formal 
learning (the dip in the ‘U’). A different position suggests early intuitive understandings 
are never fully supplanted by formal scientific knowledge (Goldberg & Thompson-Schill, 
2009; Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012): research shows that even experienced scientists, 
when forced to answer rapidly, may revert to intuitive understandings (Kelemen, 
Rottman & Seston, 2013). The level of agreement between physical intuitions and 
accepted scientific concepts may vary from person to person. Some evidence suggests 
that there is moderate correlation between a person’s performance on different types of 
tasks testing physical intuition (Riener, Proffitt & Salthouse, 2005, p744). There is also 
evidence that males perform better than females on certain types of tests of intuitive 
physics (Robert 1990; Riener, Proffitt & Salthouse, 2005, p744). There is scope for 
further research into the manner in which intuitions are formed and in particular the 
question of whether more successful science students are those whose initial physical 
intuitions more closely resemble the accepted scientific models. 
 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p48) have proposed that complex concepts are 
partially understood through metaphors with physical experience (for example 
‘UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING’). They have argued that embodied metaphors such as 
‘MORE IS UP’ are ‘deeply embedded in our culture’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p22). In 
science education, Watts and Taber (1996) proposed the explanatory Gestalt of essence 
(an echo isn’t caused: it just happens naturally), and Anderson (1986) suggested the 
experiential Gestalt of causation (objects are affected by agents). It may be that humans 
construct understandings of complex concepts by recruiting experiential resources. An 
alternative model of embodied knowledge is that of the phenomenological primitive (p-
prim) developed by diSessa (1993) and described above. He argues that ‘[i]n dealing 
with the physical world, humans gradually acquire an elaborate sense of mechanism-a 
sense of how things work, what sorts of events are necessary, likely, possible, or 
impossible’ (diSessa, 1993, p106) and these interactions result in ‘”little” pieces of 
intuitive knowledge’ or p-prims (diSessa, 2000, p91). It is claimed that a student may 
have ‘hundred if not thousands’ (diSessa, 2000, p93) of p-prims which interact to allow 
students to make judgements. P-prims may be difficult to describe in language as they 
are kinaesthetically or visually encoded (diSessa, 2000, p96). This difficulty in accessing 
p-prims may explain why a student might struggle to explain their reasoning beyond 
stating ‘that’s the way things are’ (diSessa, 1993, p112). It is also argued that p-prims 
are not discarded as a learner advances, rather the p-prims are ‘tuned towards 
expertise’ (diSessa, 1993, p114), that is, the expert scientist retains the use of intuitive 
knowledge but it has become part of an expert mental model. 
 
John Clement’s (2008) model of intuition argues that a student’s kinaesthetic 
representations of physical situations may underlie intuition and explain its implicit 
nature. He presents an excerpt from a transcript of an experienced physicist solving a 
problem: 
 
You don’t have to know any formulas to see that…God almighty! Of 
course it [the wider spring] goes way down. You know. How could it 
do otherwise?  
That’s a seat-of-the-pants feeling I would trust beyond any of it.... I 
would bet a thousand to one. (Clement, 2008, p207) 
 
Clement supports his kinaesthetic hypothesis by reporting ‘…subjects 
spontaneously use terms like ”imagining,” “picturing,” “hearing,” a situation or “feeling 
what it’s like to manipulate” a situation’ (Clement, 2008, p209). He argues that those 
engaged in problem solving may be running ‘imagistic simulations’ (Clement, 2008, 
p210) or mental simulations based on motor sensations to develop a clearer 
understanding of a problem situation.  
 
It has been argued that the grounding of intuitions in kinesthetic sensations may 
lead to a tendency to focus on physical features and a difficulty in engaging with 
abstraction. Chi and Slotta (1993), like diSessa, make the case for an intuitive physics 
that is robust and developed out of physical interaction with reality. They assert that 
‘retrieval of intuitive knowledge is driven largely by surface features’ (Chi & Slotta, 
1993, p250). Chi’s earlier research reported that novice problem solvers tended to focus 
on surface features of a problem whereas experts were more able to move beyond 
specific details to develop categorisations of problems by ‘second order features,’ that is, 
features not explicitly stated in the problem (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981, p142). They 
claim that experts develop a ‘reading’ (categorisation) of the problem ‘early’ in the 
process: one expert categorised a problem after having read only twenty percent of the 
text (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981, p145). It could therefore be argued that experts can 
intuit the significant underlying structure of a problem rapidly, whilst novices’ intuitions 
are incorrectly triggered by the concrete features of a problem. The ability to perceive 
underlying structure, and move beyond concrete details, may be a key component of the 
development from novice to expert intuition (Brock, 2006). The nature of such 
abstracted structures as a basis for intuition will be discussed in the next section. 
3.2.2 Intuition in science education research: intuition as abstracted rules. 
 
In contrast to intuitions as embodied cognition, various authors suggest 
intuitions may be automated procedures for reaching conclusions rapidly. Such 
processes can be thought of as a ‘heuristic’ or ‘a simple procedure that helps find 
adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions’ (Kahneman, 2011, 
p98). For example, the expectation bias (Jeng, 2006), which is a tendency for 
observations to be biased towards what the observer expects to see, has been observed 
in students’ reactions to anomalous data in the classroom (Champagne, Gunstone & 
Klopfer, 1985, p65). Though such heuristics are possibly also formed through 
experience of the world, their abstract and non-kinesthetic nature set them apart from 
the concepts of embodied cognition discussed above. The principle of implicit rules that 
guide cognition has appeared in the literature in a number of different 
conceptualisations. 
 
The qualitative physics model (De Kleer & Brown, 1984, pp. 7-8) was an attempt 
by artificial intelligence researchers to model the complex processes that lead to 
‘commonsense physical reasoning’ (Forbus, 1984, pp. 85-86). The authors of the model 
claim a ‘qualitative causal calculus,’ a set of simple rules and principles, underpins 
physical intuition in much the same way as a set of simple operations is used to 
construct a complex computer program (De Kleer & Brown, 1984, p8).  A different 
conceptualisation is that of intuitive rule theory developed by Stavy and Tirosh (Stavy et 
al., 2006). They identified rules which students used that led to incorrect responses to 
problems; the rules were categorised as intuitive as learners felt the rules were ‘self 
evident’ and lead to highly confident responses to the exclusion of other possibilities 
(Stavy et al., 2006, p418). The rules they cite (for example: more A- more B and same A- 
same B) are seen as unconsciously constraining complex calculations. Based upon some 
preliminary data, they hypothesise that intuitive rules are universal across cultures 
(Stavy et al., 2006, p433). Claxton (1993, p63) has proposed that learners develop 
minitheories that, unlike the stable rules described above, are fragmented and 
constantly shifting. Minitheories are compared to computer programmes in that they 
provide a set of procedures to follow in different circumstances, though these 
procedures are seen as implicit, in the form of intuition and impulse (Claxton, 1993, 
p47). A collection of minitheories can be seen as producing a ‘gut science,’ which is 
contrasted with ‘school science, based on the symbolic and idealised world of the 
science classroom’ (Claxton, 1993, pp. 51-53). The nature of relationship between 
intuitive knowledge and the statements of school and public science will be considered 
in the next section. 
 
3.2.3 Intuition in science education research: the entanglement of explicit 
and tacit knowledge 
 
Up to this point, I have considered tacit and explicit knowledge as binary 
positions. In this section I will consider the consequences, both for teaching students 
and for training teachers, of a conceptualisation of knowledge that exists along a 






















Figure 2: Speculative range of availability of conceptions 
 
 Students may possess concepts that are largely explicit, for example they believe 
that atoms ‘want’ to have full outer shells (Taber, 2003, p737). Taber (2001, p166) has 
argued that some of the more explicit conceptions students hold may be directly caused 
by teaching and has labeled them pedagogic learning impediments. By contrast, the 
presence of other concepts may be inferred by researchers from students’ utterances 
whilst the students themselves have little explicit awareness of their existence, for 
example the concept of force as a property residing in an object (Reif, 2008, p322). It 
may be useful to differentiate between concepts that have greater or lesser degrees of 
explicit availability to students.  
 
This model may be developed a step further by assuming that some concepts 
may exist as a complex combination of implicit and explicit facets (Berry & Broadbent, 
1988, p271). For example, the concept of force, may involve explicit statements of 
Newton’s laws but also elements of tacit knowledge (see figure 3). The lower half of the 
figure represents the expected development of the concept: a novice’s understanding of 
force will be largely tacit but as they move towards expertise the explicit components of 
the concept become dominant, though it is assumed they will retain tacit knowledge that 
is developed towards expert intuition. Crucially, intuition can be seen as the mechanism 
by which tacit knowledge may link to conscious understandings of a concept. 
 
Explicit and pedagogic 
concepts 
Implicit or intuitive 
concepts 
Atoms want or need to get full outer shells (Taber, 2003, p737) 
Babies develop in the mother’s tummy (Driver et al., 1994, p48) 
An object released from a circular motion follows a circular path 
(McCloskey, 1983, p126) 





























Figure 3: A concept as a combination of tacit and explicit components and the 
development of this concept with expertise 
 
 A conceptualisation of knowledge as a combination of implicit and explicit 
components may explain the challenge Feynman reported in transferring his expert 
knowledge: 
 
I don’t know how to tell you something that will transform you from a 
person who can’t analyze new situations or solve problems, to a person 
who can…But in the case of physics, I can’t transform you from 
somebody who can’t to somebody who can, so I don’t know what to do.  
Because I intuitively understand what’s going on physically, I find it 
difficult to communicate.  
(Feynman, 2013, p69, italics in original) 
 
The fact that explicit propositions are entangled with tacit knowledge explains 
how it is possible that: 'the students had memorized everything, but they didn't know 
what anything meant' (Feynman, 1985, p 212). Tacit-explicit entanglement of scientific 
concepts, may account for the gap between knowing and understanding: Kosso (2002, 
p39) claims ‘…knowledge is the sustenance of science. But knowledge without 
understanding is pretty thin soup.’ Kosso (2002) imagines a hypothetical being who 
knows everything but doesn’t understand anything and might be represented by a large 
circle entirely in the explicit section of figure 3. Kosso’s imaginary knower illustrates the 
claims that acquisition of facts alone is not sufficient for understanding (Bransford, 
Brown & Cocking, 2000, p9). Singh (2002, p1105) reports that even physics professors 
who have ‘vast amounts of physics knowledge’ can lack physical intuition when 
encountering novel problems. The extent to which tacit knowledge might explain the 
gap between knowledge of facts and understanding is an interesting area for future 
research. Such research would be challenging as a constructivist model of scientific 
knowledge suggests tacit knowledge, as well as being difficult to articulate, is likely to be 
personal: 
 
Science exists as public knowledge…When individuals read (or are told) 
this public knowledge, they interpret and internalize it in their own way. 
… the understanding of each of those bits of knowledge, the meanings 














understanding is not fixed; it is not the same as that of other people; it is 
not the same as public knowledge. (West, Fensham & Garrad, 1985, p30) 
 
Furthermore, tacit-explicit compounding is a pertinent issue for those training 
science teachers. Shulman (1986, p9) noted that effective teachers require more than a 
knowledge of subject content and defined an additional form of understanding, 
pedagogical content knowledge, as ‘ways of representing and formulating the subject 
that make it comprehensible to others.’ Yet this knowledge may be partly tacit (Cohen & 
Yarden, 2009, p134; Loughran, 2006, p109) and therefore not easily fostered in trainee 
teachers. Models of skill acquisition, for example the Dreyfus & Drefyus (1980) five-
stage model, suggest novices begins by learning explicit rules but the attainment of 
mastery requires the ability to use of holistic recognition and intuitive decision making. 
Indeed, Hammond’s (1980) model of cognitive continuum argues high performance 
results from an ability to combine explicit and implicit modes of reasoning.  
 
The difficulty of fully articulating expert knowledge has resulted in other fields 
including nursing  (McCutcheon & Pincombe, 2001) medicine (Hall, 2002), management 
(Sadler-Smith & Burke, 2009) and law (Glöckner & Ebert, 2011) developing research 
programmes investigating the role of intuitive knowledge in effective practice.  Effective 
teacher education has pre-empted Kahneman’s project of explicating implicit heuristics: 
teacher educators have long attempted to explicate the intuitive rules-of-thumb that 
lead to good teaching. In addition to the varied models of teacher mentors that already 
exist, it may be useful to emphasise their difficult role both as explicators of the tacit, 
and developers of productive intuitions (for a detailed discussion of the role of intuition 
in teaching practice see: Atkinson and Claxton, 2000). The next section focuses on 
understanding the conditions that may promote the use of intuitive thinking.  
3.3 Conditions that promote the use of intuition 
 
People do not engage in intuitive thinking all the time nor is cognition always 
conscious and reasoned. In this section I will examine conditions that encourage an 
intuitive mode of thinking: the first section examines if intuition is a way of coping with 
high cognitive load, the second section debates evidence concerning whether individuals 
display fixed preferences for intuitive thinking. The final section examines how 
understandings of the nature of science might encourage or hinder intuitive thought. 
3.3.1 Intuition is used when cognitive demand is high 
 
It has been argued that whilst deliberate thought is effortful, intuition offers a 
way of reaching decisions quickly, and with little effort, when cognitive load is high 
(Kahneman, 2011, pp. 31-38).  Several studies (Kelemen, Rottman & Seston, 2013; 
Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012; Goldberg & Thompson-Schill, 2009) have demonstrated 
that experienced scientists reverted to teleological explanations of natural phenomena 
when their information processing resources were artificially limited. For example, it is 
reported that a limited response time (Kelemen, Rottman & Seston, 2013; Goldberg & 
Thompson-Schill, 2009) is linked with activation of intuition. The effect that time 
constraints in lessons and assessments may have in encouraging or discouraging the use 
of intuition is an area that would benefit from further research; section 3.3 will examine 
evidence that an incubation period may facilitate insights. The next section examines the 
proposition that some people are more inclined than others to make use of an intuitive 
style of thinking. 
3.3.2 Is there an intuitive learning style? 
 
In addition to the effects of cognitive load, a reliance on tacit hunches may be a 
predisposition that is stronger in some individuals than others.  The construct of an 
intuitive learning style suggests some students are predisposed to intuitive thought, 
whilst others will have a preference for explicit reasoning. The construct of learning 
styles has been criticised for many years for the lack of evidence to substantiate claims 
made by its proponents (Stahl 1999; Dembo & Howard, 2007); the existence of an 
intuitive learning style in scientific thinking seems also to be thinly supported by 
evidence. Jung (1971) proposed a juxtaposition between a sensing preference, favouring 
observation and gathering evidence through the senses, and an intuitive preference, 
privileging indirect perception via the unconscious. Though the intuitive-analytical 
dimension disappeared from mainstream research for a time (Allinson & Hayes, 1996, 
p2), it has reappeared in some models of learning styles. For example, Felder and 
Silverman (1988, p675) describe some engineering students as having a ‘sensory’ 
preference favouring ‘sights, sounds and physical sensations’ whereas other ‘intuitive’ 
students value internal information, ‘possibilities, insights, hunches.’ Two small-scale 
studies (O'Brien, Bernold, & Akroyd, 1998; Wankat & Oreovicz, 1993) of engineering 
students used the Myres-Briggs Type Indicator to report the proportion of a population 
that displayed an intuitive preference. Other studies, again from very small sample, 
suggest students exhibit stable preferences for either analytical or intuitive styles in 
problem solving in physics (Thorsland & Novak, 1974) and students with an intuitive 
preference preformed better on the more abstract sections of a course (Felder, Felder & 
Dietz, 2002, p6). 
 
The difficulty with such research is there is little evidence for a reliable link 
between an expressed preference for a particular style of thought and a consistent 
application of that style in the classroom. Kahneman’s (2011) description of cognition as 
the interplay of two systems, one deliberate and one automatic, seems to be a more 
useful model. Indeed, several authors have suggested that intuition and analysis should 
not be seen as mutually exclusive processes but systems that interact in the 
development of understanding (Hodgkinson et al., 2009, p346; Bruner 1977, p58; 
diSessa, 1993, pp. 114-115). It seems likely that learners will make use of intuitive and 
explicit knowledge at some times and in some contexts. Akinci and Sadler-Smith (2013, 
p211) argue that some kinds of tasks (where time is limited and information is 
incomplete) may require the use of intuition whereas other tasks (where there is no 
time pressure and complete information) are more likely to be solved through 
deliberate thought. Hence, rather than opposing positions, they imagine intuition and 
analysis as two orthogonal axes (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2013, p218): individuals may be 
both highly intuitive and highly rational depending on the context. Rather than building 
a model of a general preference towards an intuitive or deliberate style, a more fruitful 
direction for research would seem to be to understand the specific contexts and 
contingencies that trigger the use of tacit or explicit thinking. 
3.3.3 Understandings of the nature of science and the use of intuition 
 
There are indications of a correlation between the view of science held by 
teachers and students and their attitude towards the use of intuition. Beliefs about the 
nature of knowledge and knowing have been studied for over thirty years (Rule & 
Bendixen, 2010, p95) and are known as personal epistemologies (Hofer, 2001, p355). 
There is a body of evidence indicating students’ epistemological beliefs about science 
can affect their academic performance (Mason et al., 2013), and in general more 
complex epistemologies have been linked to higher academic achievement (Hofer, 2001; 
Schommer, 1990; Kardash & Howell, 2000). Some research (Qian & Alvermann, 2000; 
Qian & Alvermann, 1995; Songer & Linn, 1991) indicates students’ beliefs about the 
nature of the science influence their approach to learning in the subject.  
 
Data from a number of small-scale studies suggest a correlation between 
students’ understanding of the nature of science and their attitude to the use of 
intuition. For example, Tsai (1998, p478) reports, in a small sample, students aligned 
with a constructivist position of the nature of scientific knowledge were more likely to 
believe scientists came to ideas through intuitions or flashes of insight than students 
with an empiricist model. A number of case studies go further than this and imply a 
correlation between personal epistemology and approach to learning. The case of two 
students, A and B, with different epistemologies of physics is presented by diSessa 
(1985). Like Hammer (1994, p152), diSessa (1985, p107), argues epistemologies of 
physics, at least for novices, may themselves be tacit. Student A believed that 
‘knowledge resides in the equations and numbers’ and viewed qualitative knowledge 
‘with suspicion’ (diSessa, 1985, p103). Contrastingly, student B is reported as valuing 
‘real understanding’ and having a strong sense of the importance of qualitative 
understandings (diSessa, 1985, pp. 103-105). Student B claimed to work through a 
problem ‘intuitively’ at first and would ‘compare his intuition with the detailed answer 
he was sure of in order to “save the good intuitions and find out the bad ones”’ (diSessa, 
1985, p104). Student B gives an account of the experience of intuition claiming he never 
explicitly choses equations but: ‘They just seem to ‘pop up’ when I need them’ (diSessa, 
1985, p104). In reflecting on the students’ class projects, diSessa (1985, p105) reported 
student A’s work contained a proof that was not extended beyond what was given but 
student B’s project was one of the best he had encountered. 
 
Lising and Elby (2005, p376) argue a students’ epistemology may cause the 
construction of a ‘wall’ between their intuitive and formal reasoning that leads to a 
failure to check calculations against everyday reasoning. Another case study that implies 
some correlation between personal epistemology and the use of intuition concerns two 
students: Ellen and Liza (Hammer, 1989). Ellen wanted to integrate the physics in her 
course with her own intuitions and reported she ‘felt,‘ or could just ‘see’ an answer 
(Hammer, 1989, p667). Liza was content to learn facts and formulas based on the 
authority of the lecturer (Hammer, 1989, pp. 665-666). Liza’s ‘methodical approach’ 
meant she performed better on routine problems than Ellen, but Ellen’s performance 
was better than Liza on qualitative problems. In a further case study, Hammer (1994) 
reports that Roger, who regarded physics as weakly coherent and given by authority, 
did not try to resolve a difficulty he encountered in solving a problem. In contrast Tony, 
who regarded physics as conceptual and coherent, is described as examining ‘his 
intuition to see how it might be misleading him’ (Hammer, 1994, 166). A correlation 
between an understanding of science that conceptualises the discipline as involving 
more than rote learned knowledge and the use of intuition may be a case of co-
development rather than causation: both personal epistemologies (Perry, 1970; Moore, 
2002), and some models of intuition (Baylor, 2001; Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1980), are 
expected to develop with experience.  
 
Students’ beliefs about the role of intuition may be influenced by the 
assumptions, implicit or explicit, their teachers hold about the nature of knowledge 
(Hofer & Pintirch 1997, p109; Russell & Munby, 1989, p112). For example, one 
undergraduate student reported feeling alienated from his studies due to a desire to 
gain an intuitive sense of engineering whilst taking a course that valued memorisation 
(Danielak, Gupta & Elby, 2010). Pomeroy (1993) conducted a survey of scientists’ and 
teachers’ beliefs about the nature of science that included questions about the place of 
intuition in science. She grouped the questions into two clusters: traditional and 
nontraditional views of science education. A selection of the statements from those 
clusters are shown below: 
 
Traditional views of science education  
 Science learning should proceed, wherever possible, hierarchically. 
 Children in science should be discouraged from “wild” ideas and encouraged to think 
carefully and logically. (Pomeroy, 1993, pp. 266-267) 
 
Nontraditional views of science education  
 Intuition plays an important role in scientific discovery. 
 Legitimate scientific ideas sometimes come from dreams and hunches.. 
 Non-sequential thinking, i.e. taking conceptual leaps, is characteristic of many 
scientists (Pomeroy, 1993, p267). 
 
The results suggested that scientists held the most traditional views of science 
with teachers, and primary teachers in particular, more likely to hold nontraditional 
views (Pomeroy, 1993, p269). Pomeroy (1993, p272) attributed this difference to the 
emphasis given to constructivism in science education courses. Though there is little 
evidence for a causal link between personal epistemologies and the effective use of tacit 
knowledge, section 3.5.2 will consider studies that have attempted to support students’ 
use of tacit knowledge by increasing their awareness of epistemological assumptions. 
This section has argued both cognitive load and the models of science students possess 
may affect their use of tacit knowledge. This might be seen as part of the move proposed 
by Taber (2009, p327) in science education research away from the ‘butterfly collecting’ 
stage of describing intuitive ideas towards understanding the contingencies of their 
activation. 
3.4 Productiveness of intuition 
 
In section 3.2.1, I reported models that conceptualised intuition, at different 
stages in a student’s development, as supporting or hindering the learning of canonical 
concepts. Bruner (1977, p60) held the view that ‘some intuitive leaps are “good” and 
some are  “bad” in terms of how they turn out.’ He added that it takes particular 
sensitivity in a teacher to distinguish between an ‘interestingly-wrong’ leap from a 
‘stupid or ignorant’ mistake (Bruner, 1977, p68). By contrast, Taber (2004, p124) 
proposes that intuitive physics theories should not be thought of as ‘wrong’ but rather 
as different interpretations of physical reality. The phenomenological knowledge that 
can at first interfere with learning may be formed into a basis for intuitive expertise. 
Some intuitive concepts will be constructive and can be used to ‘anchor’ future learning 
(Clement, Brown & Zietsman, 1989). P-prims, diSessa (1993, p114) argues, are not 
discarded but ‘tuned towards expertise.’ Interpretations of concepts that do not match 
accepted scientific models, for example a substantive ontology of gravity, can contribute 
to learning (Gupta, Elby, Conlin, 2014). Yet students may feel alienated from the science 
classroom when their initial intuitions differ from those of their teachers (Taber, 2004, 
p124); what appears to make effortless sense to teachers may be counter-intuitive for 
students. Teachers have a role to play in helping students understand the nature and 
fruitfulness of their intuitive ideas (see section 3.5.2). Rather than seeing tacit 
knowledge as something that needs to be eradicated, teachers should facilitate the 
development of expert intuitions in their students (Hammer & Elby, 2003). The next 
section examines ideas that may be used to foster productive intuitions in science 
students. 
3.5 Strategies to support productive intuition in the classroom 
 
As has been argued, intuition is ‘an essential component of expertise in physics’ 
yet is ‘difficult to convey’ (Singh, 2002, p1103). Cultivating physical intuition has been 
described as a ‘cultural norm’ and part of the hidden curriculum of physics (Redish, 
2010, p3). In ecology education, authors argue for the importance of developing an 
intuitive sense of the natural world (McLaughlin, 2005, p52; Baldwin, 1997). Yet it has 
long been felt the ‘formalism of school learning’ has ignored the role of intuition 
(Bruner, 1977, p58). Discussed below are a range of strategies that may encourage the 
use of productive intuitions in the science classroom: using simulations and practical 
work and presenting a model of the nature of science that is accepting of intuition as a 
route to understanding. 
3.5.1 Intuition and the use of simulations and practical situations 
 
The role of physical experience in generating intuition has been highlighted 
earlier in this article. Yet, it is reported that students may learn science merely as 
abstract symbolic knowledge, divorced from physical and implicit concepts, and so 
develop limited understandings (Black, 2010, p45). Black (2010, p51) argues that the 
use of computer simulations (for example, a simulation of a roller coaster showing the 
energy changes that occur) can help students to develop ‘grounded cognitions’ which 
include a “feel” for what they are learning. Fischbein (1987, p103) has claimed that 
‘what one cannot imagine visually is difficult to realise mentally’ and argued 
visualisation may be the cause of the immediacy of intuition. Visual simulation based 
learning may therefore aid in developing intuitive understanding (Swaak & Jong, 1996, 
p344). DiSessa (1986, p210) created a simulation, dynaturtle, which allowed students to 
interact with a world without drag forces and claimed it ‘is the best we can do at making 
some of the real objects of science experiential.’ He argues that experiences in 
simulations are not essentially different form experiences in the real world and can be 
used to scaffold students’ intuitive understanding of science concepts (diSessa, 1986, 
p226). Another attempt at using simulations to alter students’ tacit knowledge was 
carried out by Howe, Devine and Taylor Tavares (2013) who used a computer 
simulation to visualise students’ predictions for the paths of falling objects.  Students 
who predicted incorrect paths were often able to intuit their mistakes from viewing a 
simulation and change their prediction. 
 
Practical work may also play a role in developing intuition. The nature of 
scientific knowing could be argued to include  ‘a component that is experience-
dependent in a very personal sense’ and therefore ‘not directly teachable’ (Hodson, 
1993, p120). As Wellington and Osborne (2001, p7) argue ‘the touch and feel of 
practical work cannot be put into words,’ and some scientific ideas may be conveyed 
more effectively through gestures and body language than through talk or pages in a 
book. Rich and well-structured practical experiences may serve as the basis for the 
ability to run effective mental simulations. Thought experiments are seen as powerful 
tools for learning and rely on the ability to retrieve ‘experiential knowledge, in the form 
of visual or bodily images, of which students are not necessarily aware’ (Reiner & 
Gilbert, 2000, p490). Practical work may be conceptualised as developing a library of 
experiential resources that can be used to guide future intuitions.  
3.5.2 Intuition and teacher and student views of the nature of science: 
presenting a model of science that values intuition 
 
In section 3.3.3, I presented some evidence for a correlation between students’ 
perceptions of the nature of science and their use of intuitive resources. Though this link 
is not necessarily causal several authors have proposed increasing students awareness 
of epistemological assumptions to promote a more productive use of intuition. Hammer 
and Elby (2003) recommend teachers make students aware they will come to the 
classroom with pre-existing intuitions and explicitly teach the process of reconciling 
intuitions with scientific models. For example, they suggest informing students: ‘Very 
often you’ll have a sense that a ball or some other object ought to move in a certain way, 
but you’ll have trouble putting your finger on why you have that sense’ (Hammer & Elby, 
2003, p64). They propose setting questions that encourage students to engage with 
their tacit knowledge by explaining, for example, in what sense the intuition that there is 
a force in the direction of motion is a useful or misleading intuition (Hammer & Elby, 
2003, pp. 78-79). Modeling the process of tuning a raw intuition that ‘the car reacts 
twice as much during the collision’ into a more refined expression ‘the car feels twice as 
large a force during the collision’ (Hammer & Elby, 2003, p81) would seem to be a 
potentially useful teaching technique, though the authors themselves highlight there is 
no evidence to support the effectiveness of their approach (Hammer & Elby, 2003, p75). 
Tirosh, Stavy and Cohen (1998) suggested making students aware of an argument that 
conflicts with their intuitive rules but they report this technique caused limited 
conceptual change and only reconfirmed the stability and resistance to change of 
intuitive rules.  
 
Teachers modelling their own use of intuition in developing understanding and 
problem solving (Felder & Silverman, 1988, p68) may provide an opportunity to 
introduce students to the concept of tacit knowledge. A useful demonstration might 
involve a teacher discussing their initial intuition and then modelling the use of explicit, 
analytical methods to check the fruitfulness of the initial hunch (Bruner, 1977, p58). It 
may be beneficial, once students are comfortable with routine problem solving to 
observe teachers engaging in intuitive attempts to solve challenging problems (Fensham 
& Marton, 1992, p117). Another approach is the use of problems that raise common 
‘alternative’ intuitions and then discussing the process of tuning those intuitions to fit 
with scientific ideas (Hammer & Elby, 2003, p81; Campanario, 1998; diSessa, 1985, 
p112).  
 
Finally, it may be beneficial, to present a model of science, as described by 
Feyerabend, which allows ‘esthetic judgments, judgments of taste and our own 
subjective wishes' (Feyerabend, 1970, p90). A presentation of the use and abandonment 
of intuitions by scientists might, not only present a human and engaging version of 
scientific history, but also foster an understanding of how to manage tacit knowledge in 
students. Noble Laureate, Dudley Herschbach argued education systems did not have 
the means to foster intuition and he recommended encouraging students to see learning 
as a process of developing new perspectives rather than focusing on reaching a ‘right’ 
answer (Herschbach, quoted in Fensham & Marton, 1992, pp. 119-120). If science is 
presented as a subject that only requires rote learning and the application of formulaic 
methods, students will become frustrated when they encounter problems that cannot be 
solved by routine methods. The suggestions presented above are not presented with any 
evidence of effectiveness in educating intuition. As Bruner (1977, p59) remarked over a 
quarter of a century ago ‘…much more work is needed to discover how we may develop 
the intuitive gift of our students.’  
 
 
4.0 The concept of insight 
 
Research into insight has a long history, beginning with the work of the Gestalt 
psychologists (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995, pxv), and there continues to be an active 
research program investigating insightful problem solving (Chu & MacGregor, 2011). In 
the following sections, I will present a summary of the role of insight in the work of 
scientists before examining insight’s relationship to sudden conceptual change and the 
development of conceptual connections. After presenting some examples of insight in 
the science education literature, I will examine how educators may attempt to support 
the process in the classroom. 
4.1 Insight in the work of scientists 
 
The discoveries of Archimedes, Darwin, Kekulé, Leowi and Watson have been 
linked to insight (Gruber, 1995; Ramsland, 2012). Moments of insight have been 
described as being accompanied with feelings of pleasure: ’…it was the confluence of the 
investigation of such different phenomena…When it all suddenly “clicked” it was the 
highlight of my scientific career’ (Keller, 2000, p8752). The rewarding nature of insight 
is claimed to explain why scientists are prepared to spend long periods of time 
attempting to solve challenging problems (Metcalfe & Weibe, 1987, p238). Though such 
“Eureka” moments have attraction, it is worth remembering that they are rare events 
and many discoveries have been made in a more gradual manner (Koshland, 2007, 
p762). Moreover, many of these apparently sudden insights (for example, Kekulé’s 
visualisation of the structure of benzene) have followed years of immersion and 
conscious effort in solving a specific problem (Sadler-Smith, 2008, pp. 70-72). Classroom 
science may proceed in a similar manner; students will, most of the time, work in a 
rational and deliberate manner, yet, have occasional moments of insight. 
4.2 Insight in science education research 
 
It is difficult to find reports of students’ insight in the science classroom. 
Anecdotally teachers report students experiencing moments of sudden clarity: 
 
I have come to believe that a key element in a memorable classroom 
experience for most people is what I call the "Ah-Ha" experience. Time 
and time again people tell me of an experience in a classroom setting 
when some concept suddenly clicked for them. It may have been the 
sudden recognition of the power of vector notation, or the insight that 
all of statics is contained in just a few equations that sum forces and 
torques and set them equal to zero (Fuller, 1993, p300). 
 
Joe Redish, in a discussion of physics teaching, clearly refers to moments of insight: 
 
Often you have to work for a long time without feeling that you are 
making much progress. Then, suddenly, everything falls into place 
and it all makes sense. But until the “click,” you can’t be sure how 
much time you need to “get it” and it’s difficult to plan. Students first 
have to learn what understanding the physics feels like and be slowly 
drawn into working hard enough to learn harder and harder topics 
(Redish, 2003, p68).   
 
The next two sections will consider reports of moments of insight in science 
classrooms in the light of two theoretical models: insights as moments of sudden 
conceptual change and insights as the formation of novel connections. These processes 
are related if one assumes concepts acquire their meaning by being embedded in a 
network of concepts (Taber, 2013, p232), then development of conceptual connections 
is a feature of conceptual change (Tyson et al., 1997, p391). For example, Zeitsman and 
Clement (1997, p86) argue the development of conceptual connections in an insight, 
resulted in conceptual restructuring. The next section examines the link between insight 
and conceptual change. 
4.2.1 Insight in science education research: insight as sudden conceptual 
change 
 
Several researchers have linked sudden conceptual change to moments of 
insight (Dubar, 1995, p379; Fischbein, 1987, p5; Clement, 1989, p341), for example 
Fisher and Moody (2002, p65) describes an insight as ‘the occasion in which a 
constellation of elements suddenly and instantaneously arrange themselves in a new 
configuration.’ Conceptual change in science education has been an area of intense 
research and debate (Duit & Treagust, 2003; Treagust & Duit, 2009). There have been 
several models of conceptual change that contrasted two distinct processes of change. 
West’s (1982) categorisation of conceptual change as evolutionary or revolutionary, a 
distinction used by several authors subsequently (Özdemir & Clark, 2007, p354; Wiser & 
Amin, 2001, p332; Nussbaum, 1989, p538), carries an implication of difference in speed 
of change. For example, Duit (1994, p56) links evolutionary change with continuity and 
revolutionary change with discontinuity. However for others, the revolutionary model is 
defined as the complete replacement of one concept by another, more fruitful concept 
(Caravita & Halldén, 1994, p90) and the change may be ‘time consuming and lengthy’ 
(Özdemir & Clark, 2007, p357). Other authors however, do draw clear distinctions 
between models of conceptual change by their speed. Gilbert and Watts (1983, pp. 88-
91) proposed two models of conceptual change: a stepped change model involving 
incremental changes in concepts and a ‘catastrophe’ model, involving a ‘catastrophic 
change’ to a conception that the authors argue, ‘allows for that rapid change of 
conception which is called the 'Ah, ha' experience.’ A similar model is Thornton ‘s (1997, 
pp. 247-249) contrast between ‘extended conceptual transition’ and ‘punctuated 
conceptual evolution… an essentially instantaneous switch,’ though he argues there is 
little evidence to support the existence of such conceptual discontinuities. Conceptual 
change may be considered as sudden in the ontological categorisation model of 
conceptual change (Chi, 1997, p230), and is linked to the ‘aha’ phenomenon. Finally, 
Clement (2008, p68) distinguishes between accretionism and eurekaism and links 
insight with ‘…reorganization in the sense that a new system of relationships was 
created’ and ‘relatively sudden conceptual change’ (Clement, 2008, p99). 
 
Evidence from several researchers however, presents conceptual change as a 
largely gradual process. Nussbaum (1989, p538), for example, proposes evidence 
indicates learning shows gradual change: ‘… the student maintains substantial elements 
of the old conception while gradually incorporating individual elements from the new 
one.’ In their original paper on conceptual change, Posner and colleagues (1982, p223), 
claim that their construction of radical does not imply abruptness and argue that 
accommodation is rarely characterized by ‘a flash of insight’. Vosniadou and Ioannides 
(1998, p1226) report the idea of a sudden shift in conceptual structure implied by early 
models of conceptual change ‘has not…been supported by empirical evidence.’ 
Moreover, Vosniadou (2008, pxvi) argues that what are claimed to be radical conceptual 
changes are really the end product of a ‘slow and gradual affair and not a dramatic 
gestalt type shift.’ This preceding slow and gradual affair may be an incubation period 
(Smith, 1995). An insight that appears sudden may be the accumulation of gradual 
incremental steps in understanding (Nersessian, 1999, p14). The debate regarding the 
rate of conceptual change may to some degree depend to the density of observation of 
conceptual change. The use of a microgenetic research method, which has a high density 
of observations relative to the phenomenon being investigated (Siegler & Crowley, 
1991, p606), may help to provide a clearer picture of the rate of conceptual change. 
 
However, though conceptual change may generally be incremental, there is 
some evidence that sudden changes occur. Indeed, Vosniadou (2008, pxvi) does not rule 
out abrupt restructuring, instead it is argued that it ‘does not appear to be the usual 
road to conceptual change.’ Fisher and Moody (2002, p67) also make the case that ’a 
flash of insight, is the exception rather than the rule.’ Learning may turn out to be a mix 
of many processes, of gradual accretion of knowledge and of ‘false starts, relapses to 
intuitive conceptions and, occasionally, highly motivating and personally significant 
experiences of insight—when everything suddenly ‘‘clicks together”’ (Lappi, 2012, p2). 
Sudden moments of conceptual restructuring have been neglected in the research to 
date, perhaps due to their comparative infrequency, and the high density of observation 
required to capture them. Moments of insight, though rare, may none-the-less be highly 
significant moments in a learner’s experience and repay the significant difficulties of 
investigating their properties more closely. 
 
It is possible to find some reports of rapid conceptual change in the science 
education literature. One kind of rapid conceptual change involves an alteration in the 
conceptualisation of a problem. Insight has been linked to a change in problem 
representation (Duncker, 1945; Weisberg, 1996, p164; Chronicle, MacGregor, & 
Ormerod, 2004). Bing and Redish (2009, p13) describe how a group of students solving 
a problem became stuck in a particular frame (a particular representation of the 
problem) for 15 minutes before being able to shift their interpretation sufficiently to 
solve the problem. In Clement’s (1989) example of the spring problem, discussed in 
detail below, the process of breaking away from a particular conceptualisation is argued 
to be a significant skill: ‘In order to generate an analogy… the subject must break away 
from the original problem context’ (Clement, 1989, p350). An example of a rapid 
reconceptualisation of a problem is seen in Parnafes (2012). Natalie, a student studying 
the phases of the moon, has an insight following another student’s elaboration of which 
part of the illuminated moon is visible: ‘Natalie: Ah! One moment, (takes Rose’s hand 
away from the representation) the moon doesn't really get larger and smaller, it’s simply 
what we see. We see only the illuminated part’ (Parnafes, 2012, p393). 
 
Parnafes (2012, p393) describes this as an “Aha” moment, a moment of 
meaningful insight, and argues it follows a representational innovation: the addition of a 
straight line to a diagram enables the student to understand that the moon does not 
alter in size, only in illumination. A shift in perception of the diagram has caused a 
sudden leap in understanding, as is reported in problem restructuring of insight 
problems (Weisberg, 1995, p164). Another reported moment of insight again involves a 
change in understanding of a representation. In an unpublished Master’s thesis, 
Schwaller (2011) describes the case of students studying velocity time graphs by using 
data loggers and their subsequent whiteboard presentations to their peers. 
 
One particular “aha” moment, documented in Lenny’s learning log, 
specifically addressed the “graph as a picture” misconception… 
Lenny wrote, “I had an ‘AHA!’ moment when he explained that even 
if a ball was bounced straight up and down, it would still have a 
graph shaped like [a picture of a bouncing ball] because the graph is 
only showing the distance traveled from the ground, not the motion 
of the ball.” (Schwaller, 2011, p29) 
 
  The student’s conception of the velocity-time graph changes from a picture that 
directly represents reality to a more abstract representation: the shape of the line on a 
velocity time graph is not the shape of the physical motion. Schwaller (2011, p20) 
reports: ‘At times during the presentations, some students would spontaneously blurt 
out that they “got it.”’ Though there is some ambiguity in how “Aha” moments are 
defined, 28 are reported from 48 students in the course of one lab session (Schwaller, 
2011, p26). The majority of these “Aha” moments (18) came during the presentations 
sections. The frequency with which students experience insight is an area that requires 
further research. The next section will consider moments of insight that result from the 
sudden formation of conceptual links. 
4.2.2 Insight in science education research: insight as the development of 
awareness of conceptual relationships 
 
A study of the neural activity of people solving insight problems has concluded 
that many insights involve the ‘recognition of new connections across existing 
knowledge’ (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004, p506) a view echoed by other researchers (Wren 
et al., 2004, p390; Bowden et al., 2005, p324; Koestler, 1964, p35). Developing 
connections features in Sternberg and Davidson’s (1983, p54) model of insight which 
involves: ‘combining…isolated pieces of information into a unified whole’ and ‘relating 
newly acquired information to information acquired in the past.’ These processes are 
similar to the conceptual integration proposed in Ausubel’s (2000, p8) theory of 
meaningful learning and explain how insights may result in learning.  As has been 
suggested in defining the concept of insight, the extent of the novel relationships 
developed in an insight may range from relatively small-scale connections (such as the 
link between a practical situation and a memory of holiday in Chin & Brown, 2000, p186, 
below) or a more complex understanding of a network of relationships (see Clement, 
1989, below). 
 
In the example below, a group of students had been set the problem of 
separating a salt-sand mixture and had tried various approaches with no success. One of 
the students, Mary, describes how she recalled seeing a film of salt on some rocks during 
a visit to the seaside: 
 
…finally it dawned on me, I was like woh! [...] you know, the 
ocean's moving you know. It's warm, the sun's on it. You know, 
maybe that's how it got there. And then it just clicked at me. I was 
like wow! (Chin & Brown, 2000, p186) 
 
The authors argue that the novel connection lead to the insight (Chin & Brown, 
2000, p186). In this case, as in the case of the spring problem described below, several 
ideas were tried before the solution was hit upon; insight is rarely completely 
spontaneous (Sadler-Smith, 2008, pp. 70-72; Sinclair, 2010, p380). Singh (2002, p1103) 
has argued that experts can solve problems quickly due to an ability to perform rapid 
memory searches to find a suitable connection for the problem in memory. In an article 
outlining the use of news articles to enhance learning, Singh claims to have observed 
‘several visible “aha” moments’ which he associates with the formation of novels 
connections between pervious learning and information in the texts (Singh, 2011, pp. 
482-483).  
 
A particularly complex sub-set of the category of insights as perception-of -
connections is the case of insight via analogy formation. Analogies are defined as an 
‘overlap in relationships but not objects’ (Gentner, 1983, p161) between domains and 
imply a significantly greater depth of similarity, namely structural likeness, than would 
be expected in a simpler connection. It has been argued that '[c]omparison processes 
foster insight' (Gentner & Markman, 1997, p54) and so the development of links 
between a novel situation and a well understood base domain can be seen as bringing 
about insight (a well known example, is the analogy between the radiation problem and 
attack dispersion story found in Gick and Holyoak (1980)). The first step in the process 
of forming analogies is perceiving a significant similarity in structure between two 
domains (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Markman, 1997). Clement (1988) claims that 
students can form spontaneous analogies when they grasp similarities in the underlying 
structures of situations and Brock (2006) argues that insight is the result of the 
perception of a similar meta-structure between two domains. The observation that 
experts are better at being able to understand shared underlying abstractions than 
novices, who focus on surface details, may partly explain the connection between 
expertise and insight (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981). 
 
An extended discussion of the role of analogy in coming to understand a 
scientific problem is found in Clement’s (1989, pp. 350-365) discussion of the spring 
problem shown in figure 4. Clement set ten professors and graduate students the 
following problem: a weight is hung on a spring and its extension noted, the spring is 
then replaced with a different spring, which is made of the same material, has the same 
number of coils but their diameter is twice that of the original spring. The participants 
were asked to predict whether the second spring would stretch more, less or the same 
amount as the original spring and to justify their reasoning. 
 
 
Figure 4: The spring problem in Clement (1989, p350).  
 
One student attempting the problem is described as making several attempts to 
create different problem representations, most of which were unsuccessful: over forty 
minutes a rod, zigzag and other analogies were tried (Clement, 1989, p366). Following 
these attempts, a moment of ‘insight’ occurred when the student imagined a hexagonal 
coil which triggered a ‘flood’ of ideas that ‘arrive[d] in a rush, as if they are outside of his 
control’ (Clement, 1989, p365). This description is key to the categorization of this 
moment as an insight: though there has clearly been explicit cognition abut the problem, 
the final solution is reported as arriving suddenly and with little conscious control. The 
idea that torsion, as well as bending, will contribute to the extension of the spring, 
appeared ‘fairly quickly, with little warning’ (Clement, 1989, p358), within 80 seconds of 
the proposal of the hexagonal coil (Clement, 1989, p366). Clement reports these 
moments as being connected to emotional reactions and the student displayed ‘some 
emphatic “aha” expressions with a raised tone of voice’ (Clement, 1989, p359). 
 
 In analyzing the moment of insight in greater detail Clement argues there has 
been a reorganization of the student’s mental model from one in which bending alone is 
relevant to the extension, to one which also includes torsion. The change is deliberately 
not described as ‘revolutionary’ as the bending model is not entirely replaced by a 
torsional model (Clement, 1989, p366). The insight, though rapid, is described as ‘not 
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instantaneous’; it occurred over a four minute period which leads Clement to believe 
that the processes involved might be ‘unpackable’ into subprocesses (Clement, 1989, 
p366). The insight is instead described as ‘fairly sudden’ rather than a ‘bolt from the 
blue’ and is therefore not a ‘true Eureka event’ (Clement, 1989, p366). Clement argues 
further that there are no extraordinary processes leading up to the insight and the 
student’s thoughts follow a ‘coherent story’ throughout the process (Clement, 1989, 
p368).  
 
Another example of insight as analogy formation is described by Nikitina and 
Mansilla (2003, pp. 10-11) who report a student who realized that ‘magnetic waves’ and 
the concept of flux in his mathematics class were ‘the same understanding but at 
different angles.’ It could be argued that the process of insight occurring in this case is 
due to the perception of a connection between a novel and a familiar concept. An 
extreme example of insight as the perception of connections may be the moment when 
seemingly different situations, are suddenly seen as being structurally similar (see for 
example Fuller’s (1993) description of insight in statics above); Clement (1988, p573) 
describes this kind of simplification as the generation of a formal principle, a single 
abstract idea underlying multiple situations. The unification of diverse situations via a 
similarity in underlying structure (for example, the pendulum, mass on a spring and 
bobbing float are unified by simple harmonic motion) is seen as an important process in 
scientific understanding (Shive & Weber, 1982, pxii; Kroes, 1989). The sparse reports in 
the science education literature make it difficult to build a detailed model of insight; the 
development of a larger catalogue of such moments is a necessary step to better 
understanding the process. The next section, by discussing the conditions that favour 
insight, may shed light on the apparently low incidence of insight in science classrooms. 
4.3 Conditions that promote insight 
 
Pasteur claimed that ‘chance favours the prepared mind’ (Rees, 2015, p13); this 
section will examine the conditions that promote or hinder the sudden realisations to 
which Pasteur was alluding. Insights may occur after periods of both conscious and 
nonconscious processing, though in both cases the ultimate understanding arrives 
without conscious control. It has been observed that, after attempting a problem that is 
not immediately solvable, if time is spent engaged in an unrelated activity, an insightful 
solution may occur (Smith, 1995, p241), a process known as incubation. One 
anonymous scientist argues for the necessity of taking a break from conscious thought: 
‘You have to do 6 months of very hard work first and get all the components bumping 
around in your head, and then you have to be idle for a couple of weeks, and then-ping-it 
suddenly falls into place’ (Respondent D quoted in Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995, 
p350).  There appear to be a variety of types of incubation, depending on the task, 
however a meta-analysis of studies of insight problem solving revealed: ‘[w]hen 
attempting to solve creative problems that require a wide search of knowledge, 
individuals benefit from an incubation period’ (Sio & Ormerod, 2009, p109).  
 
If incubation time may promote the occurrence of insight, fixation may hinder 
insightful solutions. Fixation refers to ‘an inappropriate adherence to an approach to 
solving a problem’ (Smith, 1995, p235). For example, researchers have reported that 
students’ inappropriate reliance on one rote learned principle (Le Chatelier’s principle) 
led to difficulty in problem solving (Furió et al., 2000). In another example, commitment 
to an interpretation of a problem caused students to become ‘stuck’ in a particular frame 
of reasoning, leading to a failure to detect an error in their thinking (Bing & Reddish, 
2009, p13). Encouraging students to be aware of their own framing of problems, and to 
practice developing alternative conceptualisations, may lead to more insightful problem 
solving. 
 
Certain kinds of problems seem to be particularly likely to cause the sudden 
jump in understanding described above, these are called ‘insight problems’ (Weisberg, 
1995; Chronicle, MacGregor, & Ormerod, 2004). Weisberg (1995, p164) proposed two 
criteria for an insight problem: a) there must be discontinuity, that is the solver cannot 
proceed directly to the solution without a switch of approach and b) there must be 
restructuring during which the solver’s representation of the problem changes. Physics 
problems have been categorised into two groups: systematic problems, which can 
solved by consistent application of known procedures, and insight problems, which are 
resistant to algorithmic solution (Maloney, 2011, p5). Researchers in mathematics 
education have used a similar distinction, describing examination questions as either 
routine: ‘students… execute a rehearsed procedure consisting of a limited number of 
steps,’ or non-routine (Berry et al., 1999, p105). Designers of assessments might give 
consideration to the balance between routine and insight problems and the different 
skills they require of students. In general, a greater understanding of those conditions 
that foster insight in students is an area that requires further research.  
4.4 Productiveness of insight 
 
Insight, defined as a sudden explicit awareness of novel relations, is perhaps 
assumed to be an instance in which understanding converges on the canonical models of 
science. However, no such implication is intended and therefore a category of ‘false’ 
insights exists. Irvine (2015, p226) describes ‘false aha’ moments which ‘seem like a 
genuine insight’ but ‘fail the verification process.’ Categorising an insight as ‘false’ is 
problematic but consider the case of Jim Carter, described in Margaret Wertheim’s 
(2011, p157) account of outsider physics: ‘As he was falling asleep, he was stirred by a 
“delicious little dream” and suddenly the answer to the puzzle of nuclear structure 
crystallized in his mind.’ Carter’s theory of toroidal subatomic particles, cyclons, 
displays some coherence, yet conflicts with accepted scientific models and so might be 
thought of as a ‘false’ insight. It is has not been possible to find similar reports of 
students’ ‘false’ insights in science yet it seems plausible moments of sudden awareness 
of connections that fail to match canonical scientific models occur. Researchers report 
that the ‘sense of understanding’ that may accompany insights is ‘highly fallible’ and 
‘[p]eople often overestimate the detail, coherence, and depth of their understanding’ 
(Ylikoski, 2009, p104). Just as with intuition, insight can be both support and hinder 
students’ attempts to construct their own understandings of science. Whilst insights are 
often a desirable aspect of the work of scientists, there is no evidence, other than their 
speed, to consider insights as a necessary part of most students’ problem solving 
experience in the classroom, they may however be of use to teachers in assessment. 
Davidson & Sternberg, (1984, p55) have linked an ability to solve insight problems with 
giftedness and suggest insight problems may be used to identify gifted students without 
the confounding variable of prior learning.  
4.5 Strategies to support productive insights in the classroom 
 
There is disagreement about whether people can be trained to experience 
moments of insight more frequently. Dow and Mayer (2004, p397) have suggested that 
training for insight has little effect; the strategies required to solve insight problems are 
unique to their context and therefore not transferable. However, other investigators 
claim insight skills may be improved through training (Davidson & Sternberg, 1984, 
p64; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2001) and even sleep may facilitate insightfulness (Wagner et 
al., 2004). In this section I shall proposes strategies that may maximise the possibility of 
students experiencing insight in the science classroom.  
 
The apparent sporadic nature of insightful moments in the classroom may be an 
effect of the kind of problems set in schools: questions routinely only involve a search 
for the right information or formula (Levi, 2012, p12). Insight problem solving can be 
encouraged by setting problems that don’t have routine solution paths (Levi, 2012, p2). 
DeHaan (2009) advises educators to encourage students to try creative routes to 
problem solving rather than sticking to formulaic heuristics. Several books of physics 
problems that require non-routine solution methods are available (For example: 
Jargodzki & Potter, 2001; Jargodzki & Potter, 2004; Walker, 2008; Epstein, 2009). This is 
not to argue that drill like practice of routine questions has no place, it is necessary for 
becoming familiar with a novel procedure. However, such practice should not lead to the 
complete exclusion of open-ended problems, which require insight, synthesis and 
creative leaps (Felder & Silverman, 1988, p68). Given the relationship between 
incubation periods and insights, it is worrying that the science curriculum in the United 
Kingdom has been described as ‘overly-full and fact laden’ (Royal Society, 2008, p180), 
and students report being rushed through content (Osborne & Collins, 2000, p25). It has 
been suggested open-ended tasks, such as building up portfolios of work over extended 
periods, will ‘allow time for the incubation of ideas’ (Flick, 1993, p5) and may foster 
insight. Increased wait times may enable more students to reach moments of insight; 
teachers rarely allow long pauses after asking a complex question (Mujis & Reynolds, 
2010, p59). Little research exists on the frequency and causes of insightful moments in 
science education. It is hoped that by raising awareness of the process educators will be 
more receptive to opportunities that allow moments of insight to occur. 
5.0 The need for further research into tacit knowledge in science education 
   
Tacit knowledge is a challenging topic to investigate but it is hoped that the link 
between the tacit and the conscious that exists in intuition and insight will provide a 
route to understanding the concept. Due to their rapid and, at least partially, 
nonconscious nature, intuition and insight have been neglected in science education 
research (Bastick, 1982, pp. 10-12). In 1992, Fensham and Marton (p114) argued that 
researchers and curriculum developers in science education had largely ignored 
intuition and it was a rare teacher who recognised and nurtured intuition in their 
students (Fensham & Marton, 1992, p120); little seems to have changed since then. 
Studies of tacit processes however, have made great progress (Kahneman, 2011) and 
have lead to an enriched understanding of cognition. It is time for science education to 
devote time and effort to developing a model of how tacit knowledge affects learning 
(Taber, 2014). Though this article has suggested conceptualisations of the processes of 
intuition and insight, there are few empirical studies of the processes in science 
education. It is well accepted that students sometimes use intuitive concepts but there is 
a weaker understanding of how such intuitions develop and when and why they are 
used. Very few reports of students’ scientific insights exist and so the nature and causes 
of these powerful moments has been neglected. Listed below are some of the 
unanswered questions concerning insight and intuition raised by this paper: 
 
a) Do some individuals have intuitions that are more aligned with the accepted 
models of science? Are these individuals ‘better’ scientists? 
b) What are the contingencies that influence when intuitions are accessed in 
preference to more explicit knowledge? 
c) Can intuitions be ‘taught’ through engagement with practical work and 
computer simulations? 
d) How frequent are moments of insight in science learning and what hinders 
or promotes their occurrence? 
e) Is there any advantage to encouraging students to experience moments of 
insight in solving problems compared to routine approaches? 
 
More empirical studies of intuition and insight are required to answer these 
questions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail of the methods might be 
used to research tacit knowledge (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985), intuition (Sinclair, 2014) 
and insight (Chu & MacGregor, 2011), but for the interested researcher, techniques to 
study these concepts exist and have been used in various contexts. It may be that tacit 
knowledge is more influential on conscious thought in some contexts than others, 
however at this early stage in the research programme, it would be useful to see studies 
of tacit knowledge across a broad range of content areas within science education. 
Students and experts know more about science than they can directly express in words. 
In order to develop the fullest model of scientific understanding possible, researchers 
should begin to focus attention on tacit components of knowledge in science education. .  
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